We define a problem theory from first principles. We investigate the objects of this theory: problems, resolutions, and solutions. We relate problem theory with set theory and with computing theory. We find taxonomies for resolutions and for problems. We build a hierarchy of resolvers: mechanism, adaptor, internalizer, learner, and subject. We show that the problem theory is complete, that is, that there are just three ways to resolve any problem: routine, trial, and analogy. Finally, we propose a thesis: We are Turing complete subjects because we are the result of an evolution of resolvers of the survival problem. This is release candidate version 20150127, and it is licensed as cc-by. Any comments on it to papa@ramoncasares.com are welcome.
Introduction
Devoid of problems, thinking is useless. Warning This paper does not explain how to solve, nor how to resolve, any problem.
Object
¶1 · The object of this paper is to present a mathematical theory of problems. The resulting problem theory provides meaning to set theory and to computing theory. ¶2 · Problems are nearly everywhere. We can say that mathematics is all about mathematical problems, but also that physics is all about physical problems, and philosophy is all about philosophical problems. I said nearly because there are not problems in a river; a river just flows. So, where are problems? ¶3 · This problem theory provides an answer: There are problems where there is freedom. Determinists will surely object, but they should note that if there were only uncertainty, and not the possibility of doing otherwise, then problem resolving would be purposeless and absurd. Nevertheless, in this theory freedom cannot exist by itself, but freedom is always limited by a condition and both together, freedom and a condition, are a problem. In fact, the resolution of any problem is the process of spending all of its freedom while still satisfying the condition. So resolving is fighting freedom away. And, if people fight for freedom, it is because we want problems; in fact, not having any problem is boring. But I would say more, we are devices exquisitely selected to resolve problems, because surviving is literally the problem of being dead or alive: "To be, or not to be-that is the question." a condition on it, for example a temporal milestone, then governing is a problem. And there are three ways to resolve a problem (da capo). ¶4 · By analogy we mean to transform a problem into a different one, called question, which is usually composed of several subproblems. This works well if the subproblems are easier to resolve than the original problem. There are usually several ways to transform any problem (there is freedom), but only those transformations that result in questions that can be resolved are valid (which is a condition), so applying an analogy to a problem is a problem. There are three ways to resolve the analogy, the question, and each of its subproblems: routine, trial, and analogy (da capo). If we could translate a problem into an analogue question, and we could find a solution to that question, called answer, and we could perform the inverse translation on it, then we would have found a solution to the original problem. Problem Solution ↓ ↑ Question −→ Answer
Eight Concepts
¶1 · Lastly we are ready to list the eight concepts of the problem theory. They are: problem, with freedom and condition; resolution, with routine, trial, and analogy; and solution.
Problem Theory 
Notation
We will refer to the set of problems as P. We will refer to the set of resolutions as R. We will refer to the set of solutions as S. Comment A resolution takes a problem and returns the set of the solutions to the problem. Then resolutions are R = P → 2 S , where 2 S is the powerset, or the set of the subsets, of S.
3.1.2 Notation ⊤ stands for 'true', and ⊥ for 'false'. We will refer to the set of these Proof Because then f (S) = { f (s) | s ∈ S } = { g(s) | s ∈ S } = g(S). ⋄ 3.1.5 Notation Problem π is written: x? P π (x), where P π is the condition of the problem; this means that P π : S → B, so ∀x ∈ S, [P π (x) = ⊤] ∨ [P π (x) = ⊥]. Comment P π is then a predicate, or a Boolean-valued function. Comment A problem π = x? P π (x) is made up of freedom and of a condition. The condition is P π , and freedom is represented by the free variable x, which is free to take any value in S, x ∈ S.
Definition
A function * f is effectively calculable if there is a purely mechanical process to calculate * f (s) for any s. We will refer to the set of effectively calculable functions as * F. Comment If the result of the calculation is finite, then an effective calculation has to complete it. If the result of the calculation is infinite, then an effective calculation has to proceed forever towards the result.
3.1.7 Definition A problem π is expressible if its condition P π is an effectively calculable function. Comment The result of a condition is in set B = {⊤, ⊥}, so it is always finite. Therefore a problem is not expressible if for some x we cannot calculate whether x is a solution or not in a finite time.
3.1.8 Definition The condition isomorphism is the natural isomorphism that relates each problem π with its condition P π : for each predicate P there is a problem, x? P (x), and for each problem, π = x? P π (x) there is a predicate, P π . That is, P ⇔ (S → B) : x? P π (x) ↔ P π . Comment Using the condition isomorphism, two problems are equal if they have the same condition, that is, π = ρ ⇔ P π = P ρ .
3.1.9 Theorem The set of problems is the set of predicates, that is, P = S → B. Proof Based on the condition isomorphism, see 3.1.8, which is a natural isomorphism, we say that P is the set of predicates. In other words, what defines problem π is its condition P π . ⋄ 3.1.10 Lemma The name of the free variable is not important, it can be replaced:
x? P (x) = y? P (y). Proof By the condition isomorphism, see 3.1.8, both problems, x? P (x) and y? P (y), are equal, x? P (x) = y? P (y), because they have the same condition, P . ⋄ Comment This means that the rule of α-conversion stands for problem expressions.
See Curry & Feys (1958) , section 3D.
3.1.11 Definition Let π and ρ be two problems. Then π ∧ ρ = x? P π (x) ∧ P ρ (x), and π ∨ ρ = x? P π (x) ∨ P ρ (x), andπ = x? ¬P π (x). Comment In other words, P π∧ρ (x) = P π (x) ∧ P ρ (x), P π∨ρ (x) = P π (x) ∨ P ρ (x), and
Pπ(x) = ¬P π (x). Comment This provides a way to compose, or decompose, problems.
3.1.12 Definition A problem τ is tautological if its condition is a tautology; P τ is a tautology, if ∀x, P τ (x) = ⊤. A problemτ is contradictory if its condition is a contradiction; Pτ is a contradiction, if ∀x, Pτ (x) = ⊥. Comment Both τ andτ are expressible, see 3.1.7, because P τ and Pτ are effectively calculable, see 3.1.6.
3.1.13 Theorem P, ∧, ∨, ¬,τ , τ is a Boolean algebra, whereτ is the neutral for ∨, and τ is the neutral for ∧. Proof Because P π (x) ∈ B. In detail, ∀π, ρ, σ ∈ P:
1o. (π ∨ ρ) ∨ σ = x? P π∨ρ (x) ∨ P σ (x) = x? (P π (x) ∨ P ρ (x)) ∨ P σ (x) = x? P π (x) ∨ (P ρ (x) ∨ P σ (x)) = x? P π (x) ∨ P ρ∨σ (x) = π ∨ (ρ ∨ σ).
Solutions

Theorem
Everything is in S. In other words, S is the set of everything. Proof Anything, let us call it s, is a solution to problem x? x = s, because equality is reflexive, and therefore everything satisfies the condition of being equal to itself. ⋄ Comment Freedom is complete, because x is free to take any value; x ∈ S is not a restriction. Comment Some paradoxes derive from this theorem. For a constructive vision of S, see section 5. See also subsection 6.2. Corollary P ⊂ S and R ⊂ S. Even B ⊂ S. Comment If you are a teacher looking for a problem to ask in an exam, then your solution is a problem, so P ⊂ S makes sense. And if you are a mathematician looking for an algorithm to resolve some kind of problems, then your solution is a resolution, so R ⊂ S makes sense. There are many yes-or-no questions, so B ⊂ S makes sense. Corollary P π : S → B is any predicate, or any Boolean-valued function.
Notation
Let Σ π be the (possibly infinite) set of all the solutions to problem π.
So Σ π ⊂ S, or Σ π ∈ 2 S , and Σ π = { s | P π (s) }. Comment A solution of the problem is any use of freedom that satisfies the condition; so s is a solution of problem π, if P π (s) stands.
3.2.3
Lemma Σ π∨ρ = Σ π ∪ Σ ρ , and Σ π∧ρ = Σ π ∩ Σ ρ , and Σπ = Σ π . Proof Just apply the definitions in 3.1.11:
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For a contradictory problem, x?τ (x), nothing is a solution, Στ = ∅.
Lemma
The solutions of π ∧ ρ are solutions of π and of ρ.
The reader is free to explore this Boolean landscape, but here we will close with the following theorems.
3.2.7 Theorem 2 S , ∪, ∩, −, ∅, S is a Boolean algebra, where ∅ is the neutral for ∪, and S is the neutral for ∩. Proof The powerset of a set M, with the operations of union ∪, intersection ∩, and complement with respect to set M, noted Q, is a typical example of a Boolean algebra.
3.2.8 Theorem P, ∧, ∨, ¬,τ , τ is isomorphic to 2 S , ∪, ∩, −, ∅, S , that is, P ∼ = 2 S . Proof We define the bijection Σ that relates each problem π with the set of its solutions Σ π : for every problem π ∈ P there is a set, the set of its solutions, Σ π ∈ 2 S , and for every set S ∈ 2 S there is a problem, π S = x? x ∈ S, where π S ∈ P. Now, by lemma 3.2.3, the bijection translates properly all three operations, ∨ ↔ ∪, ∧ ↔ ∩, ¬ ↔ −, and, by lemma 3.2.4, also the two neutrals,τ ↔ ∅, τ ↔ S. ⋄ Comment We will call P ∼ = 2 S the set isomorphism. That is, P ⇔ 2 S : π ↔ Σ π . Comment Using the set isomorphism, two problems are equal if they have the same solutions, that is, π = ρ ⇔ Σ π = Σ ρ .
Theorem
The set of problems is equal to the powerset of the solutions, that is, P = 2 S . Proof The equality P = 2 S derives directly from the set isomorphism P ∼ = 2 S , see 3.2.8, because no property was abstracted out. ⋄
Definition
The set of singletons, S 1 , is:
The singleton isomorphism is the isomorphism between S and S 1 that relates each s ∈ S to the set {s} ∈ S 1 , and the converse. That is, S ∼ = S 1 , and S ⇔ S 1 : s ↔ {s}. Comment We can extend any operation on S to S 1 . For example, for any binary operation * on S, we define {a} * {b} = {a * b}. Comment From the singleton isomorphism: S ∼ = S 1 ⊂ 2 S .
Lemma
The set of solutions S is a subset of the set of problems P, that is, S ⊂ P. Proof By the singleton isomorphism, see 3.2.11, S ∼ = S 1 , and, by the set isomorphism, see 3.2.8, for each singleton there is a problem, so S 1 ⊂ P, and then S ∼ = S 1 ⊂ P. ⋄ Paradox We have both, S ⊂ P and, by 3.2.1, P ⊂ S, but S = P. Comment If we only accept effectively calculable functions and recursively enumerable sets, then S * ⊂ P * , see subsection 6.2.
3.2.13 Lemma Σ π is any set, and P π is its characteristic function. Proof Σ π is any set because, by theorem 3.2.1, everything is in S, and Σ π ⊂ S. P π is its characteristic function, by the definition of Σ π . ⋄ Comment Being Σ π any set, and P π its characteristic function, every item of set theory applies to Σ π , including paradoxes.
Definition
A problem π is solved if there is a known solution of π. Comment To solve a problem, given the set of its solutions Σ π , a choice function f c : 2 S \ ∅ → S is needed.
A problem is solvable if it can be solved. More precisely, problem π is solvable if |Σ π | > 0, and unsolvable if |Σ π | = 0. Comment That means that a problem is solvable if it has any solution. A problem is unsolvable if it has not any solution, that is, if Σ π = {} = ∅. Comment Solved implies solvable, but not the converse: Solved ⇒ Solvable.
Routines and Trials
Notation
We will refer to the routine of problem π as R π . The routine is the set of the solutions to the problem, a set which is known. Then R π = Σ π . Comment The routine of π, R π , is then, or an extensive definition of Σ π , Σ π = {s 1 , . . . , s n }, or a procedure P that generates all problem π solutions, and then halts. If the number of solutions is infinite, |Σ π | ≥ ℵ 0 , then R π has to be a procedure P that never halts.
A trial on problem π over the set of possible solutions S, written T π (S), returns the set of those elements in S that satisfy the problem condition P π . Then T π (S) = { s ∈ S | P π (s) }. Comment Mathematically we will ignore the practical problem of governing the trial.
Practically we will need a halt condition to truncate the calculations that are too long (or infinite), and some ordering on the tests to fit the execution of the tests to the available calculating machinery.
Definition
To test if a possible solution s ∈ S is a solution to problem π, is to replace the free variable with s. So, being π = x? P π (x), then to test if s is a solution is to calculate P π (s). Comment Testing is a calculation S → B.
Remark Replacing variables in expressions requires not confusing free with
bound variables, nor bound with free variables. Comment This means that the rule of β-conversion, and the rules γ for substitution, stands for testing. See Curry & Feys (1958) , section 3D for β-conversion, and section 3E for substitution (the rules γ).
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3.3.6 Lemma If S is a superset of Σ π , then a trial on problem π over S resolves π, that is, Σ π ⊂ S ⇒ T π (S) = Σ π . Proof Using theorem 3.3.5, Σ π ⊂ S ⇒ S ∩ Σ π = Σ π ⇔ T π (S) = Σ π . ⋄ Corollary If S is a superset of Σ π , then a trial on problem π over S is equal to the routine of π, that is,
Lemma
The routine of problem π is a trial on the tautological problem τ over all the solutions of π. That is, R π = T τ (Σ π ). Proof By 3.3.5, 3.2.4, and 3.2.7-3a, T τ (Σ π ) = Σ π ∩ Σ τ = Σ π ∩ S = Σ π = R π . ⋄ Comment Resolving routinely, no tests are required.
Theorem
The routine is a trial over all the solutions, that is, R π = T π (Σ π ). Proof By theorem 3.3.5, T π (Σ π ) = Σ π ∩ Σ π = Σ π = R π . ⋄ Comment Usually, it is easier to apply P τ than to apply P π . Comment T π (R π ) = T π (Σ π ) = Σ π = R π .
Analogies
Notation If
A is an analogy, and π = x? P π (x) is a problem, then Aπ is another problem Aπ = x? P Aπ (x). That is, A : P → P. Comment So analogies transform a condition into a condition, P π into P Aπ in this example. Comment Taking advantage of problem decomposition, see 3.1.11, the result of an analogy, Aπ, can be a composition of problems that are easier to resolve than the original problem, π. In general, Aπ = i jπij , whereπ ij is π ij orπ ij .
Definition
If Σ π = Σ Aπ , then we say that the analogy is conservative.
Comment If an analogy is not conservative, then a function T A to translate Σ Aπ to Σ π is required, because otherwise the analogy would be useless.
Notation
We will call function T A the translating function of analogy A.
3.4.4 Lemma An analogy followed by another one is an analogy. Proof Because any analogy transforms a problem into a problem: P → P. ⋄ Corollary Analogies can be chained.
Lemma
Using only analogies we cannot resolve any problem.
Proof Because using analogies we only get problems. ⋄ Comment While routines R and trials T (S) are functions that return a set, P → 2 S , analogies A are functions that return a function, P → P.
Notation
We will write A • T to express the composition of functions, where A is applied first and then T .
Comment If A 1 and A 2 are analogies, then A 1 • A 2 is also an analogy, by lemma 3.4.4.
Definition To resolve a problem by analogy
ℜ is any resolution, and T A is the translating function of A. Diagrams:
Comment Analogy A is a translation from some original problem domain to some analogue problem domain. Then, by lemma 3.4.5, we need a resolution ℜ to resolve the analogue problem. And, finally, we need to translate the solutions back to the original domain.
Lemma The translating function of the composition
. Comment This is how analogies can be chained.
Definition
The identity function, written I, transforms anything into itself:
∀x, I(x) = x. Comment The identity function I is an effectively calculable function, see 3.1.6. It is λ-definable; in λ-calculus, I = (λx.x). Comment Identity I transforms π into π, I(π) = π, and P π into P π , I(P π ) = P π . Comment Identity I can work as an analogy: Iπ = I(π) = π.
3.4.10 Lemma The translating function of the identity analogy is the identity function: 3.4.12 Theorem A • T Aπ (S) • T A , where A is an analogy, T Aπ (S) is a trial, and T A is the translating function of A, is the general form of a resolution. Proof If the analogy is the identity I, then the general form is reduced to T π (S), because T I = I, Iπ = π, so I • T Iπ (S) • I = T π (S), which is a trial. By theorem 3.3.8, a routine is a specific trial, R π = T π (Σ π ), so I • T π (Σ π ) • I = T π (Σ π ) = R π reduces the general form to the routine. Resolving by analogy is, by definition, A • ℜ • T A , and analogies can be chained, by lemma 3.4.4, so a chain of analogies is an analogy,
⋄ Summary There are three ways to resolve: routine R π , trial T π (S), and analogy A.
Metaproblems
3.5.1 Definition A resolution ℜ : P → 2 S is a valid resolution for a problem π if it finds all the solutions of problem π, and then halts. In other words, ℜ is a valid resolution for π if it satisfies two conditions: that ℜ(π) is effectively calculable, and that ℜ fits problem π, that is, that ℜ(π) = Σ π . Comment If Σ π is infinite, |Σ π | ≥ ℵ 0 , then a valid ℜ(π) does not halt, but it keeps building Σ π forever.
Definition
A problem π is resolved if there is a known valid resolution for π. Comment To solve a problem we have to find one solution, see 3.2.14. To resolve a problem we have to find all the solutions. To resolve a problem is to exhaust the problem.
Lemma
Once a problem is resolved, we can thereafter resolve it by routine.
Proof Once a problem is resolved, we know all of its solutions, Σ π , and knowing Σ π , we know its routine resolution, because R π = Σ π , see 3.3.1. ⋄
If π ∧ ρ is solvable, then by resolving π ∧ ρ both π and ρ get solved.
Proof If π ∧ ρ is solvable, see 3.2.15, then π ∧ ρ has, at least, one solution, let us call it s, which is a solution of π and it is also a solution of ρ. By resolving π ∧ ρ, see 3.5.2, we get all the solutions of π ∧ ρ, including s. By knowing s, both π and ρ get solved, see 3.2.14. ⋄
Definition
A problem is resolvable if it can be resolved. More precisely, problem π is resolvable if there is a valid resolution for the problem, that is, if there is a resolution ℜ to problem π that finds all the solutions of problem π, and then halts. Otherwise, problem π is unresolvable. Comment Resolved implies resolvable, but not the converse: Resolved ⇒ Resolvable.
For any Boolean-valued function P : S → B, we define the functioň P : B → 2 S , as follows:P
Comment We callP the inverse of condition P .
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PT 13 3.5.7 Lemma If P π (x) is the condition of a problem π, thenP π (⊤) = Σ π andP π (⊥) =
Theorem The inverse of the condition of a problem, provided it is an effectively calculable function, resolves the problem and its complementary. Proof By lemma 3.5.7,P π (⊤) = Σ π , then ℜ(π) =P π (⊤) resolves π ifP π (⊤) is effectively calculable, see 3.1.6. And ifP π (⊥) is effectively calculable, then it resolves the complementary problem, ℜ(π) =P π (⊥) = Σπ. ⋄ 3.5.9 Definition The metaproblem of a problem, written Ππ, is the problem of finding the valid resolutions to problem π. So, if π = x? P π (x), then Ππ = ℜ? [ℜ(π) = Σ π ]. Comment The solutions of the metaproblems are the resolutions, ΠS = R. Comment The condition of the metaproblem, P Ππ , is
3.5.10 Lemma A metaproblem is a problem. Proof Ππ = x? P Ππ (x). ⋄ Comment A metaproblem is a problem because it has its two ingredients: there are several ways to resolve a problem, so there is freedom, but only the valid resolutions resolve the problem, so there is a condition.
Definition
, or, using another α-conversion, P Π (p, r) = [r(p) = Σ p ], for any problem p ∈ P, and any resolution r ∈ R. Comment P Π (π, x) = [x(π) = Σ π ] = P Ππ (x). Comment Ππ = x? P Π (π, x).
Metaresolving is resolving the metaproblem to resolve the problem. Comment Metaresolving is a kind of analogy. Diagram:
Function f c is a choice function, and the last calculation, noted (π), means to apply π as the argument, not as the function. If you only metasolve, then you don't need to choose. In any case, the translating function of metaresolving is T Π = f c • (π). Then we can draw the following diagrams:
Theorem
To solve the metaproblem Ππ of problem π is to resolve problem π.
Proof Because to resolve problem π is to find a valid resolution of π, see 3.5.2, and to solve, see 3.2.14, the metaproblem Ππ is to find a solution to Ππ, which is to find a valid resolution of π. ⋄ Comment Again, ΠS = R.
www.ramoncasares.com 20150127 PT 14
Lemma
The set of the valid resolutions for problem π is the routine resolution of its metaproblem Ππ, that is, { ℜ | ℜ(π) = Σ π } = R Ππ . Proof R Ππ = Σ Ππ , by the definition of routine, see 3.3.1.
And Σ Ππ = { ℜ | ℜ(π) = Σ π }, by the definition of Ππ, see 3.5.9. ⋄
Definition
The meta-metaproblem of π, ΠΠπ, is the metaproblem of the metaproblem of π. The meta n -metaproblem of π, Π n Ππ, is (the metaproblem of) n the metaproblem of π, where n ∈ N.
Comment From ΠS = R, we get ΠΠS = ΠR and Π n ΠS = Π n R. Comment The condition of the meta n -metaproblem of π, P Π n Ππ , where n ∈ N, is:
The meta n -metacondition P Π n Π , with n ∈ N, is:
Lemma
The meta-metacondition P ΠΠ is a metacondition P Π , and, more pre-
We have the following infinite series of mathematical objects:
by the set isomorphism, see 3.2.8. ΠS = R, by the metaproblem definition, see 3.5.9, and R = P
And so on. ⋄
3.5.20
Theorem There is only one level of problem meta-ness. Proof The condition of any meta n -metaproblem Π n Ππ, n ∈ N, is, by lemma 3.5.18, P Π n Ππ (r) = P Π n Π (π, r) = P Π (Π n π, r), where Π n π is a problem, and r a resolution. Therefore, every meta n -metaproblem condition is P Π (p, r), where p is a problem, p ∈ P, and r is a resolution, r ∈ R. ⋄ Comment While a problem condition is any unary predicate, P (x), a metaproblem condition is a specific kind of binary predicate, namely, P Π (p, r) = [r(p) = Σ p ]. And any meta n -metaproblem condition, P Π n Π , is the same specific binary predicate P Π .
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PT 15 3.6 Resolution Typology 3.6.1 Theorem There are five types of resolution. Proof From theorem 3.4.12 we get three types for the resolution of problems: R π , T π (S), and A • T Aπ (S) • T A . This shows that there are several ways of resolving, so choosing a resolution that find solutions to the original problem π is another problem, the metaproblem Ππ, see 3.5.9. Then we should get another three for the resolution of the metaproblem, but, by 3.5.14, the set of the resolutions of a problem is the routine resolution of its metaproblem, so we only add two more for the metaproblem:
Finally, by 3.5.20, we do not need to go deeper into meta n -metaproblems. ⋄ Comment We will call them: routine R π , trial T π (S), analogy
The first three can also be called meta-routines.
Remark
The diagram for the meta-trial, or trial of the metaproblem, is:
And the diagram for the meta-analogy, or analogy of the metaproblem, is: using 3.5.19 . Both are functions taking sets of functions on sets to sets and returning sets of functions on sets to sets.
3.6.3 Definition The power of a resolution ℜ, noted Φℜ, is the set of the problems that the resolution ℜ resolves, that is, Φℜ = { π | ℜ(π) = Σ π }.
3.6.4 Lemma The problem π? [ℜ(π) = Σ π ] is equal to the power of the resolution ℜ, that is, Φℜ = π? [ℜ(π) = Σ π ]. Proof The set of solutions of problem π? [ℜ(π) = Σ π ] is { π | ℜ(π) = Σ π } = Φℜ.
Using the set isomorphism, see 3.2.8, the problem is the set of its solutions. ⋄ Comment The problem π? [ℜ(π) = Σ π ] is nearly the metaproblem of problem π, see 3.5.9. The condition seems the same, but the metaproblem asks for resolutions given a problem, while the power asks for problems given a resolution.
Lemma
The power of the routine of problem π, ΦR π , is the singleton to which π belongs, {π}, that is, ΦR π = {π}. Proof First, we apply an α-conversion to the definition Φℜ = { ρ | ℜ(ρ) = Σ ρ } in order to avoid confusion. Then,
3.6.6 Lemma The power of the trial T π (S), ΦT π (S), is the powerset of S, that is, ΦT π (S) = 2 S . Proof Using the set isomorphism, see 3.2.8, each subset U of S, U ∈ 2 S , defines a problem π U , so π U = U and then
S is the superset of each U in its powerset, ∀U ∈ 2 S , U ⊂ S, then, by lemma 3.3.6, the trial T π (S) resolves each π U . T π (S) cannot resolve more problems, because the powerset of S, 2 S , exhausts the subsets of S.
The power of a trial of problem π, T π (S), does not depend on problem π.
3.6.7 Lemma If Σ π ⊂ S, then ΦR π ⊂ ΦT π (S). Proof If Σ π ⊂ S, then, by lemma 3.3.6, T π (S) resolves π, so π ∈ ΦT π (S). Therefore,
Then, every π such as
3.6.9 Lemma The power of the trial of the metaproblem, T Ππ (R), is the union of the powers of the elements of 4.1.4 Notation We will refer to the set of Turing machines as T. We will refer to the set of the strings of symbols as E. Comment Because all Turing machines tapes are equal, the processor defines the Turing machine, and therefore we will refer to the Turing machine whose processor is P as the Turing machine P, and then P ∈ T. We will refer to the finite string of symbols written in the tape as the expression e ∈ E.
The set of expressions is countable, that is, |E| = |N| = ℵ 0 . Proof Let I be any finite alphabet, and s its cardinality, that is, s is the number of symbols, s = |I| > 0. We write I n the set of strings of length n, so |I n | = s n . Then E = n∈N I n , and we can define a bijection between E and N this way: it maps the empty string in I 0 to 0, it maps the s strings in I 1 to the next s numbers, it maps the s 2 strings in I 2 to the next s 2 numbers, and so on. Note that ordering the symbols in I, we can order alphabetically the strings in each I n . ⋄ Comment Most real numbers are not expressible. See Turing (1936) §10 for details; but, for example, transcendental numbers π and e are computable, page 256.
4.1.6 Notation We will use the notation P[e] ֒→ r in order to indicate that, if we write the expression e ∈ E on the tape of the Turing machine whose processor is P and we leave it functioning, then when it halts we will find the expression r ∈ E on the tape. If, on the contrary, the Turing machine P does not halt when we write the expression w, then we would say that w is a paradox in P, and we would indicate this as follows:
Comment Some computations do not halt, so we need ∞ to refer to them. Note that ∞ / ∈ E, but ∞ ∈ E + .
Definition
For each Turing machine P ∈ T we define a function F P : E → E + , this way:
Comment If ∀e ∈ E, F P (e) = F Q (e), then we say that Turing machines P and Q are behaviorally equivalent, P ≡ F Q, or that P and Q implement the same function.
4.1.9 Lemma For each Turing machine we can define a unique finite string of symbols, that is, ∃c : T → E such that P = Q ⇔ c(P) = c(Q). Proof Proved by Turing (1936) , §5. Turing machines are defined by their processors, which are finite state automata. And every finite state automaton is defined by the table that describes its transition function T in full, which is a finite table of expressions referring to states, input symbols and output symbols. A table can be converted to a string just using an additional symbol for the end of line, and another symbol for the end of cell. To assure uniqueness, we have to impose some order on the lines and on the cells. ⋄ Comment c(P) ∈ E is the string of symbols that represents the Turing machine P ∈ T. 4.1.10 Definition We will refer to p = c(P) as a program, and to the set of programs as P. Comment P ⊂ E. www.ramoncasares.com 20150127 PT 18 4.1.11 Definition The program isomorphism is the natural isomorphism that relates each Turing machine P ∈ T with the expression describing it, c(P) = p ∈ P. That is, T ⇔ P : P ↔ c(P). Comment Now, T ∼ = P ⊂ E ⊂ E + .
Lemma
The set of Turing machines is countable, that is, |T| = |N| = ℵ 0 . Proof Proved by Turing (1936) , §5. Using the program isomorphism, see 4.1.11, we order the Turing machines according to its corresponding program p = c(P). We can order the programs, because they are finite strings of symbols, for example first by length, and then those of a given length by some kind of alphabetical order. Once ordered, we can assign a natural number to each one. 
Proof Proved by Turing (1936) 
Definition
The terminating condition P σ : T → B is:
Comment A terminating Turing machine always halts. There are not paradoxes in a terminating Turing machine.
The terminating problem is σ = p? P σ (p). The non-terminating problem isσ = p? ¬P σ (p). Comment The terminating problem follows from the condition isomorphism of problems, see 3.1.8, applied to the terminating condition P σ . The non-terminating problem is derived from the terminating one by negation, see 3.1.11. Comment The set of terminating Turing machines is Σ σ , and the set of non-terminating Turing machines is Σσ. 
Comment An algorithm is the expression of a computation that always halts.
We will refer to the set of algorithms as A. Turing (1936) , models the calculations done by a person. This means that we can compute whatever any Turing machine can compute provided we have enough time and memory, and therefore we are Turing complete provided we have enough time and memory.
Theorem
All universal computers are equivalent. Proof Turing (1937) showed that Church λ-definability is equivalent to Turing computability. Kleene (1936) showed that Church λ-definability is equivalent to Gödel and Herbrand recursiveness. ⋄ Comment A universal Turing machine is equivalent to a λ-calculus interpreter, where a λ-calculus interpreter is a device that can perform any λ-calculus reduction. A universal Turing machine is equivalent to a mathematician calculating formally, and without errors, any recursive function. Comment The universal Turing machine, the λ-calculus interpreter, and the mathematician, who is a person, are equal in computing power. And all of them are Turing complete.
Proviso
Whenever we apply a general computing statement to a finite computing device, we should add a cautious 'provided it has enough time and memory'. Comment From now on, we will understand that the proviso 'provided it has enough time and memory' is implicitly stated whenever we refer to a finite computing device. Comment In the case of a universal computer, this means that, though the finite universal computer can perform each and every step of the computation exactly the same as the unrestricted universal computer, the finite universal computer could meet some limitations of time or memory that would prevent it to complete the computation. In that case, the same finite universal computer, provided with some additional time, and some more memory, would perform some more computing steps www.ramoncasares.com 20150127
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exactly the same as the unrestricted universal computer. This extension procedure can be repeated as desired to close the gap between the finite and the unrestricted universal computer.
Convention
Because all universal computers are equivalent, we can use any of them, let us call the one used U, and then drop every U from the formulas, and just examine expressions, that is, elements in E. In case we need to note a non-halting computation, we will use ∞. Comment Using the convention is as if we were always looking inside the tape of U. Given a universal computer, U, computing is about expressions manipulating expressions. Example Formula U[c(P) d] ֒→ r is reduced to [c(P) d] ֒→ r, and even to [p d] ֒→ r, using the rewriting rule: ∀P ∈ T, c(P) = p. If the universal computer is a λ-calculus interpreter, then this is usually written as the β-reduction (p d) → r, where the left hand side is a λ-application, and p is defined by some λ-abstraction.
Definition
For each program p ∈ P we define a function F p : E → E + , this way:
Comment If ∀e ∈ E, F p (e) = F q (e), then we say that programs p and q are behaviorally equivalent, p ≡ F q, or that p and q implement the same function. Comment It is a consequence of the program isomorphism, see 4.1.11. In other words,
Thesis What is effectively calculable is computable.
Comment This is Church's thesis, or rather Turing's thesis, as it was expressed by Gandy (1980) . There, 'something is effectively calculable' if its results can be found by some purely mechanical process, see 3.1.6, and 'computable' means that the same results will be found by some Turing machine. Then, * F ⊂ T. Comment 'What is computable is effectively calculable' is the converse of Turing's thesis, T ⊂ * F. And it is obvious that if a Turing machine can compute a function, then the function is effectively calculable, see 3.1.6, by a Turing machine. Therefore, * F = T.
Remark An effectively calculable function is not an input to output mapping;
it is a process to calculate the output from the input. Example To multiply a number expressed in binary by two we can append a '0' to it, which is an effectively calculable function that we will call app0. But the complete memoization of the same function, which we will call memoby2, is not effectively calculable because it would require an infinite quantity of memory. And therefore, app0 = memoby2 .
with the definition of recursively enumerable set, in 4.4.8. The only remaining gap is to equate the valid resolution ℜ of the resolvable problem to the Turing machine of the recursively enumerable set, a gap that we can bridge with the help of Turing's thesis, see 4.3.7. Finally see that, by the set isomorphism, see 3.2.8, we can refer interchangeably to the problem π or to the set of its solutions Σ π . Then we can say that a problem is recursively enumerable, or that a set is resolvable. ⋄ 4.4.10 Definition A set is recursive if its characteristic function can be computed by a Turing machine that always halts.
4.4.11
Theorem Expressible in problem theory is* equivalent to recursive in computing theory, that is,
Proof The condition of a problem, P π , is the characteristic function of the set of its solutions, because Σ π = { s | P π (s) }, see 3.2.13. Then, if the set of all the solutions to a problem is a recursive set, see 4.4.10, then the condition P π can be computed by a Turing machine that always halts. So the condition P π is an effectively calculable function, and therefore the problem is expressible, see 3.1.7. If Turing's thesis, 4.3.7, is true, then the converse is also true; just go backwards from expressible to recursive. Finally, by the set isomorphism, see 3.2.8, we can refer interchangeably to the problem π or to the set of its solutions Σ π . Then, we can say that a problem is recursive, or that a set is expressible. ⋄
Lemma
The limitations of full resolution machines are* the limitations of universal computers. Proof Because a full resolution machine is* a universal computer, see 4.4.7. ⋄ Comment Even if universal computers are the most capable computers, they cannot compute everything, see 4.3.11. Now we will present some limits related to problems.
A full resolution machine can* execute any resolution, but it cannot* express some problems. Proof There is a recursively enumerable set that is not recursive; this is the last theorem in Post (1944) §1, page 291. Translating, by theorems 4.4.9 and 4.4.11, to problem theory: there is* a resolvable problem that is* not expressible. ⋄ Comment This is the problem limit of full resolution machines*. Comment That last theorem in Post (1944) §1, page 291, is an abstract form of Gödel's incompleteness theorem, see Post (1944) §2.
A full resolution machine can* execute any resolution, but it cannot* resolve some problems. Proof Let us call κ some problem that is resolvable but not expressible, see 4.4.13.
This means that ∃ℜ | ℜ(κ) = Σ κ , but ∃P κ | P κ (x) = [x ∈ Σ κ ]. Note that |Σ κ | ≥ ℵ 0 , because otherwise ∃P κ . Then its metaproblem Πκ is solvable but not resolvable. Πκ is solvable because κ is resolvable, see 3.5.13, or, easier, because ℜ is a solution to Πκ. For Πκ to be resolvable there should be a resolution that would find 'all the solutions of Πκ', that is, 'all the valid resolutions of κ'. But, whenever a possible valid resolution of κ, let us call it ℜ ′ , generates a value not yet generated by ℜ, let us call it z, we cannot decide whether z ∈ Σ κ and it will be eventually generated by ℜ, or if z / ∈ Σ κ and it will never be generated by ℜ; remember that κ is not expressible, ∃P κ . And, not being able to decide on z, we cannot decide whether ℜ ′ is a valid resolution of κ or not. ⋄ Comment This is the resolution limit of full resolution machines*. Comment Problem κ is named after the complete set K of Post (1944) , §3.
A full resolution machine can execute any resolution, but it cannot solve some problems. Proof Some problems have not any solution, Σ π = {} = ∅. ⋄ Comment This is the solution limit of full resolution machines, which also applies to full resolution machines*. Comment An unsolvable problem can be resolved by showing that it has not any solution. For example, the Turing problem of the halting problem, Tη, see 4.5.4 below, was resolved unsolvable by Turing (1936) , §8.
4.4.16
Theorem A full resolution machine* can execute any resolution, but it cannot express some problems (problem limit), and it cannot resolve some problems (resolution limit), and it cannot solve some problems (solution limit). 
Definition
The halting condition P η : T × E → B is:
The halting problem is η = (p, d)? P η (p, d) .
Comment The halting problem η corresponds to the halting condition P η by the condition isomorphism of problems, see 3.1.8. Comment P σ (p) = d∈E P η (p, d), see 4.2.5, so σ = d∈E η, by 3.1.8 and 3.1.11. .1, means that there is a Turing machine that always halts, and that computes P π for each possible input. Therefore, P π is effectively calculable, see 3.1.6, by a Turing machine, and then the problem π is expressible, see 3.1.7, and then it is also expressible*. Now from expressible to solvable. If a problem π es expressible, then its condition P π is an effectively calculable function, see 3.1.7. Then, if the Turing's thesis stands, see 4.3.7, that is, if it is expressible*, then there is a Turing machine P that can compute P π exactly as the effectively calculable function. P always halts, because P π is a condition, so its result is finite. Therefore, the Turing problem Tπ of the problem has a solution, P, and then Tπ is solvable, see 3.2.15. ⋄ Corollary The halting problem η is not expressible*. Proof The Turing problem of the halting problem, Tη, is not solvable, see 4. 5.5, and then the halting problem η is not expressible*. ⋄ Comment The halting problem η is inexpressible*, but solvable. While the Turing halting problem Tη is unsolvable, the halting problem η has many solutions.
Lemma
The following equivalences stand:
Proof The last one is trivial. The other two equivalences were already proved in 4.5.6, and 3.5.13. ⋄
Definition
A problem π can be: expressible* (E) or not expressible* (E), resolvable* (R) or not resolvable* (R), and solvable (S) or not solvable (S). Comment Not every combination is possible.
Lemma
If a problem is expressible*, then it is resolvable*, that is, E ⊂ R. Proof Because every recursive set is recursively enumerable. This is a corollary to the first theorem in Post (1944) §1. To translate between sets and problems we use theorems 4.4.9 and 4.4.11. ⋄ Comment The first theorem in Post (1944) §1, page 290, states that a set M is recursive if and only if both the set M and its complement M are recursively enumerable.
If a problem is not solvable, then it is expressible*, that is, S ⊂ E. Proof If a problem ν is not solvable, ν ∈ S, then Σ ν = {}, see 3.2.15. So ν is a contradictory problem, see 3.1.12, and its condition P ν is the contradiction Pτ , that is, ∀x, P ν (x) = Pτ (x) = ⊥. So P ν = Pτ is an effectively calculable function, see 3.1.6, and therefore ν is expressible, see 3.1.7, and then expressible*. ⋄ Comment Being expressible*, by lemma 4.5.9, ν is also resolvable*: S ⊂ E ⊂ R.
Theorem
Regarding expressibility* (E), resolvability* (R), and solvability (S), there are four classes of problems, as shown in the table. 
Definition
We say that a problem is finite, if the set of its solutions is finite.
We will refer to the set of finite problems as F . That is, F = { π | |Σ π | < ℵ 0 }.
Lemma
The set of finite problems F is a subset of the set of expressible problems E. The set of not solvable problems S is a subset of the set of finite problems F . That is, S ⊂ F ⊂ E. Proof F ⊂ E because all finite sets are recursive.
S ⊂ F because ∀ν ∈ S, |Σ ν | = 0 < ℵ 0 . ⋄ Comment S ⊂ F ⊂ E ⊂ R ⊂ P. Comment The topology S ⊂ F ⊂ E ⊂ R ⊂ P partitions the problem space P into five places: S, F ∩ S, E ∩ F, R ∩ E, and R.
Remark
The upper part of this topology is further refined by the so called Turing degrees of unsolvability, that we will call Turing degrees of inexpressibility. Turing degree zero, 0, corresponds to the first three places, because E = 0.
4.5.15
Remark Noting E p the set of problems defined by a condition that can be computed in polynomial time, and R p the set of problems that can be resolved in polynomial time, then E p ⊂ E and R p ⊂ R. And while E ⊂ R, by 4.5.9, R p ⊂ E p , because R p ⊂ F ⊂ E p , and the so called 'P = NP?' question asks if R p = E p , and then it should be called the 'R p = E p ?' question.
www.ramoncasares.com 20150127 PT 28 5 Resolvers 5.1 Semantics and Syntax 5.1.1 Remark In this section 5, we will always be inside a Turing universe, see 4.3.9, and accordingly we will drop every asterisk. Though some results do not depend on Turing's thesis, by now the reader should know when it is the case.
Definition
A resolver is a device that takes problems and returns solutions. Comment A resolver executes resolutions. Comment After theorem 4.4.1, we can equate a resolution ℜ ∈ R to the computing device that executes the resolution P ∈ T, that is, ℜ = P.
We will call the domain of S semantics. We will call the domain of S → S syntax. Comment As λ-calculus shows, we only need functions to implement any syntax. Comment By theorem 3.2.1, everything is in S, including S → S. But this is both mathematically impossible, by Cantor's theorem, and practically not interesting. Example Using a practical example, if the problem is the survival problem, so some behaviors keep the resolver alive, and the rest cause the death of the resolver, then S is the set of behaviors, and it does not include anything that is not a behavior, not even predicates on behaviors, nor functions. Note that the condition of the survival problem, which is satisfied if the resolver does not die, is a predicate on behaviors.
Remark
In this section 5, we will assume that S is not the set of everything, and, in particular, we will assume that there are not any function in S. We will focus on the survival problem, and then assume that S is the set of behaviors, or finite state automata, but you can think that S = N, or any other countable set, see 4.3.17. Then we will build a series of resolvers, from the simplest one implementing one element of S, to more complex resolvers that have to implement functions in order to look for resolutions to deal with metaproblems.
Definition
A problem type, for example P B , is a subset of the set of problems, that is, P B ⊂ P. We will note S B the set of the solutions to the type of problems P B . That is, ∀π B ∈ P B , Σ πB ⊂ S B ⊂ S. Comment The survival problem is not a single problem, but a type of problems, P Ω ; each living being faces a different survival problem. But, in this case as in many others, what it is certain is that the solutions to any of these problems is of a specific kind. For example, while eating can be a solution, imagining how to eat is not a solution, even though it can help us to get something to eat. Then S Ω is the set of behaviors.
Lemma
An exhaustive search on S B will resolve any problem of type B, π B ∈ P B , that is, T πB (S B ) = Σ πB . Proof T πB (S B ) = Σ πB ∩ S B = Σ πB , the first equality by 3.3.5, and the second because Σ πB ⊂ S B . ⋄ 5.1.7 Lemma If the set of the solutions to some kind of problem is finite, |S F | < ℵ 0 , then each and every problem of that kind is expressible and resolvable. Proof By lemma 4.5.13. ⋄ Comment If |S F | = N < ℵ 0 , then |P F | = 2 N < ℵ 0 and |R F | = (2 N ) 2 N < ℵ 0 . In the finite case, |S F | < |P F | < |R F | < ℵ 0 .
5.1.8 Remark Metaproblems Ππ are a type of problem, ΠP = P Π , and its solutions are resolutions, ΠS = S Π = R, see 3.5.9.
5.1.9 Definition A constant function K s : S → S is: ∀s ∈ S, ∀x ∈ S, K s (x) = s. Comment Every constant function K s is effectively calculable, see 3.1.6. They are λ-definable; in λ-calculus, K = (λsx.s). Because of this, our λ-calculus includes the K combinator, and so we refer to the λK-calculus simply as λ-calculus. Special cases Tautology: K ⊤ = P τ . Contradiction: K ⊥ = Pτ . See 3.1.12.
Definition
The constant isomorphism is the natural isomorphism between S and the set of constant functions K that relates each s ∈ S with K s ∈ (S → S). That is, S ⇔ K : s ↔ K s . Comment We can extend any operation on S to K. For example, for any binary operation * on S, we define ∀x,
Remark
but it is not a syntactic function f ∈ ((S → S) → (S → S)), because the semantic function f takes semantic elements and returns semantic elements, while, using the constant isomorphism, the syntactic function f is not restricted. In particular, a semantic function cannot take a function, and a semantic function cannot return a function. Comment In semantics literal identity i is the identity, see 4.3.15, because there are not higher order functions in semantics. But, different syntactic objects can refer to the same semantic object, as in f (x) = y, which means that f (x) and y are two syntactic objects that refer to the same semantic object. Then, there are two identities in syntax: literal identity i, which is the semantic function that just returns what it takes, and functional identity u, which is the syntactic function that follows the references and returns the final one, see 4.2.3. Note also that a syntactic object can refer to no semantic object, and then we say that the syntactic object is a paradox.
Definition
The range of a resolver ℜ, noted Ξℜ, is the set of the problems that the resolver ℜ solves, that is, Ξℜ = { π | ℜ(π) ∩ Σ π = ∅ }. Comment ℜ(π) ∩ Σ π = ∅ means that ℜ provides, at least, one of the solutions of π. Comment In practice, if |Σ π | > 1, it is not sensible to generate all the solutions, Σ π , when just one solution solves the problem.
Theorem S ∩ Φℜ ⊂ Ξℜ.
Proof Because ∀π ∈ Φℜ ∩ S, we have that π ∈ Φℜ so ℜ(π) = Σ π , see 3.6.3, and then ℜ(π) ∩ Σ π = Σ π , and also that π ∈ S, so |Σ π | > 0 ⇔ Σ π = ∅, see 4.5.8 and 3.2.15, and therefore ℜ(π) ∩ Σ π = Σ π = ∅, and then π ∈ Ξℜ. ⋄ Comment For solvable problems, Φℜ ⊂ Ξℜ, so they are easier to solve than to resolve.
But unsolvable problems, some of them resolved, are impossible to solve! 5.1.14 Lemma ∀π, ℜ ′ (π) ⊂ ℜ(π) ⇒ Ξℜ ′ ⊂ Ξℜ.
Proof That ℜ ′ (π) ⊂ ℜ(π) implies that it exists an ℜ ′′ (π) such that ℜ(π) = ℜ ′ (π) ∪ ℜ ′′ (π). And then, Ξℜ = { π | ℜ(π) ∩ Σ π = ∅ } = { π | (ℜ ′ (π) ∪ ℜ ′′ (π)) ∩ Σ π = ∅ } = www.ramoncasares.com 20150127
Definition
We will say that the resources of a resolver are in a set if the capability implemented in the resolver belongs to that set. Comment Now we will define a series of resolvers ℜ n , from the minimal one that only implements one solution, and generalizing step by step. Each resolver will implement just one element out of its resources 5.2 Mechanism 5.2.1 Definition A mechanism ℜ 0 is any resolver that implements one member of S. That is, the mechanisms resources are in S, and then { ℜ 0 } = S. We will write ℜ 0 [s], where s ∈ S, the mechanism that implements s, that is, ℜ 0 [s] = s ∈ S. Comment Mechanism ℜ 0 [s] returns s unconditionally. Comment A mechanism ℜ 0 implements a semantic unconditional calculation.
Notation
As resolutions return sets of elements in S, to normalize the situation of mechanisms ℜ 0 we will use the singleton isomorphism, see 3.2.11, and we will write ℜ 0 [{s}] to mean the singleton {s}, that is,
Lemma
The range of the mechanism ℜ 0 [{s}] = {s} is the set of problems for which s is a solution, that is, Ξℜ 0 [{s}] = { π | P π (s) }. Proof Just applying the definition of range, see 5.1.12, to the definition of mechanism, we get:
Any singleton routine resolution R π can be implemented by the mechanism ℜ 0 [R π ]. Proof If R π is a singleton, then R π = {s}, and R π = {s} = {ℜ 0 [s]} = ℜ 0 [{s}]. ⋄ Definition A general mechanism is a device that implements semantic unconditional calculations. Corollary Any finite routine resolution R π can be implemented by the general mech-
But, if |Σ π | ≥ ℵ 0 , then the dotted equality is not possible, because it equates an infinite number of devices ℜ 0 [s] to one device that then should have to perform an infinite number of unconditional calculations. ⋄ Example In practice, it only makes sense to implement one solution. Without conditional calculations, the resolver cannot control when to apply one result or any of the others, so it gains nothing implementing more than one. Comment The mechanism ℜ 0 is a body capable of one behavior.
www.ramoncasares.com 20150127 PT 31 5.3 Adaptor 5.3.1 Definition An adaptor ℜ 1 is any resolver that implements one condition on the members of S. That is, the adaptors resources are in S → B, and then { ℜ 1 } = (S → B). We will write ℜ 1 [P S ] the adaptor that implements P S , where P S ∈ (S → B) , that is, ℜ 1 [P S ] = P S ∈ (S → B). Comment An adaptor ℜ 1 implements a semantic conditional calculation. 
Then T π (S) .
The equality is dotted because, if the trial is not an effectively calculable function, then it cannot be implemented. ⋄ Example In practice, an adaptor has a body capable of several behaviors that provides the set S of behaviors. If the current behavior were not satisfying some adaptor condition P π , which is interpreted as an error, then the adaptor would change its behavior trying another one in S. A thermostat is an example of adaptor. Comment The adaptor ℜ 1 is a body capable of several behaviors, and a governor that selects the current behavior.
5.4.9 Definition A function F : 2 S → 2 S is elementable if it exists an effectively calculable function f : S → S such that ∀S, F (S) = { f (s) | s ∈ S }. Comment We write F (S) = f (S), by the rules in 3.1.3. Note the three requirements:
that f is a semantic function, f : S → S, that f is effectively calculable, and that F (S) = f (S).
Any elementable analogy resolution a • T aπ (S) • T a can be implemented by the internalizer ℜ 2 [T a ](S ∩ a(Σ π )). Proof An analogy resolution is A • T Aπ (S) • T A . Both A and T A are functions from sets to sets, T A : 2 S → 2 S and A : (P → P) ∼ = (2 S → 2 S ), so if both A and T A were elementable, then an internalizer could implement them. We will call a and T a the elementable functions such that A(S) = a(S), and T A (S) = T a (S). Then P aπ = a(P π ) = a(π) = a(Σ π ) implements the first third,
implements the second third, see 5.3.6, and using 5.4.5, ℜ 2 [T a ](S ∩ a(Σ π )) implements the whole analogy resolution a • T aπ (S) • T a . ⋄ Example While an adaptor uses a trial and error resolution, and this means that error is part of the usual procedure, an internalizer executes the trial and error inside itself.
If the analogy provides a good model, then the internal trial is as good as the external one, with the advantage that the errors are only simulated errors. More to the point, if the problem the resolver faces is the survival problem, then the adaptor errors are literally death errors, or at least pain, while the internalizer errors are just mental previsions of what not to do. See that, if a = i, then the model is good, because the internal problem is equal to the external one. Comment The internalizer ℜ 2 is a body capable of several behaviors, a governor that selects the current behavior, and a simulator that tests internally, or predicts, what would be the outcome of different behaviors.
Learner
Definition
A learner ℜ 3 is any resolver that implements one condition on the members of S → S. That is, the learners resources are in (S → S) → B, and then { ℜ 3 } = ((S → S) → B). We will write ℜ 3 [P F ] the learner that implements P F , where P F ∈ ((S → S) → B), that is, ℜ 1 [P F ] = P F ∈ ((S → S) → B). Comment A learner ℜ 3 implements a syntactic conditional calculation.
Remark
Learners are to syntax as adaptors are to semantics. Comment When solutions are functions S → S, then a learner does what an adaptor does, which is to return a predicate on solutions. That is, learners on metaproblems are as adaptors on problems. But, learners can go further.
Lemma
Each learner ℜ 3 [P F ] implements one set of members of (S → S).
Proof Because every predicate P F defines a set 
The results are the same, but not the implementation.
Rewriting
Comment These are not sets of solutions, but sets of semantic functions: 
In the meta-trial T Ππ (R), R is a set of resolutions, where R = (P → 2 S ) ∼ = (2 S → 2 S ), that is, P R : (2 S → 2 S ) → B, and the condition of the metaproblem Ππ is also P Ππ :
So if both P R and P Ππ are elementable by ℘ R and ℘ Ππ , then both of them, and its conjunction, are implementable. Then
⋄ Example Internalizer success depends crucially on the analogy, that is, in its pair of functions a and T a . And a learner can adapt the analogy to the problem it is facing, because the learner implements a set of functions from which it can select a pair. Adapting the analogy is also known as modelling. So a learner can apply different analogies, but a learner can also apply a routine if it knows a solution, because the routine is more efficient, or a trial, when the model is not good enough or too pessimistic. Comment The learner ℜ 3 is a body capable of several behaviors, a governor that selects the current behavior, a simulator that tests internally, or predicts, what would be the outcome of different behaviors, and a modeler that adjusts the model used by the simulator.
Summary
The following table organizes some of what we seen about the five types of resolver.
Comment An internalizer is a syntactic mechanism. A learner is a syntactic adaptor. A subject is a syntactic internalizer. A subject is a meta-syntactic mechanism.
Theorem
The problem theory is complete.
Proof Aside from definitions, the problem theory posits that there are three ways to resolve a problem: routine, trial, and analogy; see 2.3. Adding the metaproblem of the problem, we get five ways to resolve a problem and its metaproblem, which are the basic three plus meta-trial and meta-analogy, see 3.6.1. For each way there is a resolver, see lemmas 5.2.4, 5.3.6, 5.4.10, 5.5.8, and 5.6 .10, and the resources of each resolver are in a series of mathematical objects of increasing generality that covers everything until syntactic functions, see 5.7.2. Now, to execute meta-analogies, 2 2 S →2 S → 2 2 S →2 S , see 3.6.2, or at least the elementable ones, see 5.4.9, we need subjects, which implement syntactic functions (S → S) → (S → S). And there is a subject that is a Turing complete device, ℜ 4 [u], see 5.6.9, so it has the maximum computing power, see 4.3.10, and then the maximum resolving power, see 4.4.7. This means that there are not more resolvers beyond the subject, and therefore that the series is complete, and then that the problem theory covers everything and is complete. ⋄ Comment This means that no more resolutions are needed, although we could do without routine, for example, by using theorem 3.3.8, and then reducing routines to trials. Nevertheless, a routine is not a trial, because a semantic element is not a semantic set, or because a mechanism implementing a routine is not an adaptor implementing a trial, see first comment to lemma 5.3.4. Comment This theorem is true if the Turing's thesis is true, see 4.3.7. Conversely, if this theorem is true, then 'what is effectively calculable to resolve problems is computable'.
Remark
Provided that a bigger range means more survival opportunities, that the adaptor, the internalizer, the learner, and the subject conditions are satisfied in some environments, and that in each step the increasing of complexity was overcome by its fitness, then an evolution of resolvers -mechanism to adaptor to internalizer to learner to subject-should follow.
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Comment Although depending on conditions, the evolution of resolvers is directed, and its final singularity is the Turing complete subject ℜ 4 [u].
Thesis
We are the result of an evolution of resolvers of the survival problem. Argument The resolvers hierarchy suggests an evolution of resolvers of the survival problem, see 5.7.4 . And lacking of better explanations, that we are Turing complete resolvers, that is, subjects ℜ 4 [u] = U, see 4.3.1, suggests that we are indeed the result of an evolution of resolvers of the survival problem. Comment Our species is Turing complete. Therefore we must explain the evolution of Turing completeness.
6 Conclusion 6.1 Purpose ¶1 · The problem theory is the union of set theory and computing theory. The integration of the two theories is achieved by using a new vocabulary to refer to old concepts, but mainly by giving the old theories a purpose that they did not have: to resolve problems. For example, a set defined by intension is named a problem, and the same set defined by extension is named its set of solutions. While both still refer to the same set, as it is the case in set theory, the status of each of them is now very different: one is a question and the other is an answer. And when the problem theory states that computing is resolving, it is calling a set resolvable if it is recursively enumerable, but mainly it is saying that the transition from intension to extension has to be calculated, because it is not written magically in "The Book"; someone has to write it. ¶2 · The purpose of resolving problems is not final, but the main conclusion of the paper, the thesis 5.7.5, is nearly ultimate: We are Turing complete subjects because we are the result of an evolution of resolvers of the survival problem. In other words, we resolve problems to survive. So, if survival is indeed the ultimate purpose, then the problem theory provides purpose and meaning to set theory and to computing theory. ¶3 · The final thesis 5.7.5 also closes a loop, because a Turing complete resolver ℜ 4 [u] can model 'everything', and then 'everything' can be a solution, as it is stated in theorem 3.2.1. But those 'everything's are not absolute, but limited, see 4.4.16, basically to what is effectively calculable. That is, if Turing's thesis stands, see 4.3.7, then 'everything' is everything that is computable. This way a restriction of computing theory, countability, is inherited by problem theory and transferred to set theory; see the details below in subsection 6.2. The other question that requires some more detail is the status of the Turing's thesis itself, which we will postpone until subsection 6.3. ¶4 · Nevertheless, besides that main thesis 5.7.5, the problem theory concepts presented in this paper can be used to model, understand, and classify both natural and artificial resolvers, because the paper provides definitions, theorems, and taxonomies for resolvers, and also for problems. And, by the way, the paper defines adaptation and learning, and it shows that there are just three ways to resolve any problem: routine, trial, and analogy.
www.ramoncasares.com 20150127 PT 39 6.2 Countability ¶1 · In computing everything is countable, see 4.1.13, and the problem theory in Turing universes inherited countability from computing theory, see 4.4.5. In a Turing universe, see 4.3.9, the Turing's thesis is true, see 4.3.7, and there are only effectively calculable functions, including predicates, see 3.1.6, and recursively enumerable sets, see 4.4.8. Then problem theory in Turing universes is consistent if and only if computing is consistent. And computing is consistent, as a corollary to Church-Rosser theorem in λ-calculus, see Curry & Feys (1958) chapter 4. ¶2 · Therefore, our way to control paradoxes in set theory, and then in this paper, is to confine ourselves to Turing universes. Don't worry, if this is a Turing universe, as it seems to be, then we are only excluding imaginary universes. ¶3 · For example, the mathematical theorem that states that everything is a solution is proved, and it makes sense, see 3.2.1. But it also causes paradoxes, because from it we derive P ⊂ S, but P = (S → B) . = 2 S , and then |P| . = |2 S | . = 2 |S| > |S|, by Cantor's theorem. It is not a paradox in a Turing universe because the dotted equalities are false in it. The first dotted equality is false because, as we saw in lemma 4.4.13, there are resolvable problems that are not expressible, so [(S → B)
2 S ] * . The second dotted equality is false because the first one is false. And the third dotted equality is false because the number of recursively enumerable sets is countable, so, if |S * | = ℵ 0 , then |2 S | * = ℵ 0 < 2 ℵ0 = 2 |S * | , that is, |2 S | * < 2 |S| . Therefore, P * ⊂ S * is true, but P * is the set of effectively calculable predicates, that is, P * is E of 4.5.8, and [2 S ] * ⊂ S * is also true, but [2 S ] * is the set of recursively enumerable sets, that is, [2 S ] * is R of 4.5.8. The conclusion is that S * , the set of solutions, is the set of everything that is computable. ¶4 · We have just rejected the uncountable case, where |P| > ℵ 0 , but there are other two possibilities: the (infinite) countable case, where |S * | = |P * | = |R * | = ℵ 0 , see 4.4.5; and the finite case, where |S F | < |P F | < |R F | < ℵ 0 , see 5.1.7. ¶5 · We are finite, so it would be natural to restrict our investigations to the finite case, calling for finiteness instead of calling for countableness. But the finite case is trivial, and more importantly, the difference between an unrestricted universal computer and a finite universal computer is not qualitative but quantitative. There is not any step of any unrestricted universal calculation that a finite universal computer cannot compute. So in the limit, that is, without time nor memory restrictions, we are universal computers. And note that those restrictions are variable, and that they can be relaxed nearly as desired just spending some more time, or building a faster computer machine, or using some more external memory. In the case of a Turing machine, the external memory is the tape, and the internal memory is where its processor keeps the current state. Note also that we can code an algorithm to generate every natural number, although we cannot follow the computation till its end. Summarizing: we are better defined saying that we are qualitatively universal Turing machines, but with some unspecified quantitative limitations, than saying that we are qualitatively finite state automata, because finite state automata are not expandable. ¶6 · Finally, the rejections of finiteness and uncountableness imply that countableness is the golden mean. This is Pythagorean heaven revisited, everything is countable, but this time we have rescued the terrifying √ 2, and other irrational numbers. As Kronecker wrote: "God made counting numbers; all else is the work of man". www.ramoncasares.com 20150127 PT 40 6.3 Intuition ¶1 · Is it possible to resolve a non-computable problem? A problem is computable if, by definition, a Turing machine can execute a valid resolution of the problem, so the non-computable problem would not be resolved by computing, but by other means. My answer to the question is 'no', because I think that a problem is resolvable if, and only if, the problem is computable, see 4.4.1. ¶2 · Nevertheless you may think otherwise, and say that there is another way of resolving, let us call it 'intuition', that is not computable. If that were the case, then the problem theory with its mathematical formulation, as presented in this paper, would capture the concept of 'computable problem', but not the whole concept of 'problem'. In order to see this, please consider the following two statements:
• Some problems are computable.
• A universal computer can execute any computable resolution. Even if you believe that there are resolvable problems that are not computable, you can still decide easily that both are true; the first is a fact, and the second is a theorem. And then everything in this paper would still be true of computable problems, computable resolutions, and computable solutions.
¶3 · A key point in this discussion is that 'intuition' would refute Turing's thesis, see 4.3.7, which is not a theorem, because if there were 'intuitive' resolutions, then we could calculate solutions that are not computable. Summarizing: If Turing's thesis were eventually false, then this problem theory would be about computable problems. But, while Turing's thesis remains valid, the problem theory is about problems, universal computers are the most capable computing devices (4.3.10), everything is an expression (4.3.16), resolving is computing (4.4.1), the set of effectively calculable functions is countable (4.4.2), and the problem theory is complete (5.7 .3).
